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Introduction
On August 26, 2011 a Eurocopter (Airbus Industries) AS350 B2 aircraft crashed after
suffering “a loss of engine power as a result of fuel exhaustion” (National Transportation Safety
Board [NTSB], 2013). The pilot, flight nurse, flight paramedic and patient were all killed. Day
Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident. The purpose of
this flight was an interfacility transfer.
According to the NTSB Final Report (2013), after arriving at the sending facility, the
flight nurse and flight paramedic went into the Emergency Department to prepare the patient for
transport. The pilot notified the company communications center by cell phone that the
helicopter did not have as much fuel on board as previously thought, and they would have to stop
en route to the receiving hospital to refuel. Several options were discussed, and the pilot decided
they would attempt to make it to an airport 58 nautical miles away. The communications center
asked the pilot if he was going to refuel the aircraft and return for the patient, or if they were
going to refuel with the patient on board? The pilot stated they would refuel with the patient on
board en route to the receiving hospital.
After the patient was loaded, the aircraft took off with 45 minutes of fuel on board.
When the pilot failed to report landing at the destination airport, a ground search was initiated.
The wreckage was discovered approximately one nautical mile from the approach end of the
runway at the destination airport. The Final Report found the probable cause of the crash to be:
[T]he pilot’s failure to confirm that the helicopter had adequate fuel on board to
complete the mission before making the first departure, his improper decision to
continue the mission and make a second departure after he became aware of a
critically low fuel level, and his failure to successfully enter an autorotation when
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the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the accident were (1)
the pilot’s distracted attention due to personal texting during safety-critical ground
and flight operations, (2) his degraded performance due to fatigue, (3) the
operator’s lack of a policy requiring that an operational control center specialist be
notified of abnormal fuel situations, and (4) the lack of practice representative of
an actual engine failure at cruise airspeed in the pilot’s autorotation training in the
accident make and model helicopter (NTSB, 2013).
Because of its unique flight environment, helicopter emergency medical services
(HEMS) is among the most dangerous types of flying in commercial aviation today (Federal
Aviation Administration [FAA], 2014). “The pressure to safely and quickly conduct …
operations in various environmental conditions … makes EMS operations inherently dangerous”
(NTSB, 2006b, p. vii). Off airport operations, low altitude flight environment, remote and/or
challenging locations, spotty or inaccurate weather data along the route of flight, and little or no
warning before mission dispatch are all factors which add to the complexity of HEMS flying
(Zuccaro, 2009).
This study was conducted to enhance understanding of the factors that contribute to
HEMS accidents. Building on prior research, Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS) was used to examine HEMS accidents for the years 2000-2016. Questions
addressed include:
1. Which errors or preconditions occurred most often?
2. Which errors or preconditions were most frequently associated with fatal
accidents?
3. During which phase of flight did most of errors take place?
4. How do these findings compare with previous research?
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HFACS
Building on James Reason’s (1990) “Swiss Cheese” model of human error, the HFACS
system provides investigators with a “comprehensive, user-friendly tool for identifying and
classifying the human causes of aviation accidents” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 13).
Originally developed for the Navy and Marine Corps, HFACS is now used by all branches of the
military when investigating human error accidents (Bilbro, 2013). It has also been used to
examine civilian commercial airline accidents and incidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001).
HFACS divides human failure into four main categories: unsafe acts, preconditions for
unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences. Unsafe acts can be loosely
subdivided into two groups: errors and violations. Errors are any action that fails to achieve its
intended outcome (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Violations on the other hand, arise because of
the “conscious failure to adhere to procedures or regulations” (Helmreich, 2000, p. 782). The
main difference between errors and violations is intent: violations are deliberate whereas errors
are not.
Within HFACS, errors are further divided according to cause. Skill-based errors
represent well practiced behaviors that occur without significant thought. In aviation, these are
referred to as the “stick and rudder” skills necessary to safely and competently fly an aircraft
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Skill-based errors occur during routine activities when attention
is diverted from a task or there is a failure of memory. In most cases the individual has the
knowledge, skills, and experience to perform the action, but something causes the operator’s
attention to stray or a checklist item is forgotten (von Thaden, Gibbons, & Suzuki, 2007).
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Table 1
Unsafe Acts
Errors

Examples

Skill-Based

Breakdown in visual scan
Failed to prioritize attention
Inadvertent use of flight controls
Omitted step in a procedure
Omitted checklist item
Poor technique
Over-controlled the aircraft

Decision Based

Improper procedure
Misdiagnosed emergency
Wrong response to emergency
Exceeded ability
Inappropriate maneuver
Poor decision

Perceptual Errors (due to)

Misjudged distance/altitude/airspeed
Spatial disorientation
Visual illusion
Adapted from (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 4)

Decision errors “represents intentional behavior that proceeds as intended, yet the plan
proves inadequate or inappropriate for the situation” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 4).
Decisional errors result from the pilot’s failure to choose the correct procedure, adequately
diagnose the problem, or make the appropriate choice among competing priorities.
The third major type of error deals with perception. Perceptual errors typically occur
when “sensory input is degraded or ‘unusual,’ as is the case with visual illusions and spatial
disorientation, or when aircrews misjudge the aircraft’s altitude, attitude, or airspeed” (Shappell
& Wiegmann, 2000, p. 5). It is important to stress it is not the illusion or disorientation that is
classified as a perceptual error; rather, it is the pilot’s inappropriate response to the disturbance.
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For example, instrument rated pilots routinely experience visual or vestibular disturbances while
flying in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). Because of this, their training
emphasizes relying on the instruments while ignoring their senses. These altered sensations only
contribute to error when the pilot fails to adhere to training and responds inappropriately, as is
the case when the pilot flies the aircraft under control into the water or ground during a “black
hole” approach on a dark, starless night.
The second major cause of unsafe acts are violations. Violations are decisional errors.
They are the conscious failure to follow established procedure or rules. Violations may be
classified as either routine or exceptional (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Routine violations are
usually known by the management structure and tolerated. They traditionally do not have a
consequence attached and therefore become part of the company’s culture. “Observation shows
that if the quickest and most convenient path between two related points involves transgressing
an apparently trivial and rarely sanctioned safety procedure, then it will be violated routinely by
the operators of the system” (Reason, 1990, sec. 7.2).
Exceptional violations are those that are not tolerated by management and often have
significant consequences attached to their discovery. They occur “when an individual is
attempting to solve problems in unusual situations. The individual, in attempting to solve new
problems, violates a rule to achieve the desired goal. These violations are commonly associated
with high risk, often because the consequences of the action are not fully understood or because
the violation is known to be dangerous but seems inescapable” (Health and Safety Executive,
1995, p. 9).
In addition to the unsafe acts of the operator, HFACS remains cognizant of how physical
and mental limitations, as well as the occupational environment, affect human error. HFACS
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addresses preconditions, which allow or encourage human error to occur. In terms of the
operator (pilot and/or flight crew), HFACS divides preconditions into two classes: substandard
condition of the operator and substandard practices of the operator. Substandard condition of the
operator include adverse mental states (complacency, get-home-itis, loss of situational
awareness, hazardous attitudes, and misplaced motivation), adverse physical states (fatigue,
illness, incapacitation) and physical or mental limitations such as insufficient reaction time and
physical or mental incompatibility with the task (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Substandard
practices include Crew Resource Management (CRM) issues and personal choices such as selfmedicating and violations of bottle to throttle requirements.
Beyond the operator, HFACS examines the supervisory and organizational decisions and
practices that prevent or encourage error. Unsafe or inadequate supervision as well as decisions
from upper management all play a role in orchestrating the milieu in which errors occur. Reason
(1997) insists that oftentimes human error is “more a consequence than a cause” and that “errors
are the symptoms that reveal the presence of latent conditions in the system at large” (p. 226).
A common reaction to error is to blame the operator (Reason, 1990, 1997, 2008; Shappell
& Wiegmann, 2000). In this way errors are treated as a Human Resources concern; one where
individual punishment follows any infraction. “This punitive approach does not solve the
problem. People function within systems designed by an organization. An individual may be at
fault, but frequently the system is also at fault. Punishing people without changing the system
only perpetuates the problem rather than solving it” (Boysen, 2013, p. 400). HFACS highlights
the role supervisors and upper management have in error genesis.
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Table 2
Unsafe Supervision
Act

Examples

Inadequate Supervision

Failed to provide guidance
Failed to provide oversight
Failed to provide training
Failed to track qualifications
Failed to track performance

Planned Inappropriate
Operations

Failed to provide correct data
Improper staffing
Mission not in accordance with rules and
regulations
Inadequate crew rest

Failed to Correct a Known
Problem

Failed to identify an “at risk” aviator
Failed to initiate corrective action
Failed to report unsafe tendencies

Supervisory Violations

Authorized unnecessary hazard
Failed to enforce rules and regulations
Authorized unqualified crew for flight

Adapted from (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 10)

Methods
HEMS accident data from calendar years 2000-2016 were obtained from the NTSB’s
Aviation Accident Database. The search criteria included any accident that happened during the
period in question, involved a non-experimental helicopter, occurred within the United States (no
territories), and was on a non-scheduled Part 135 air taxi or commuter flight at the time of the
accident. These crashes were then culled to only include those that were engaged in HEMS at
the time of the accident.
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The NTSB reports two levels of investigation: factual and final. NTSB factual reports
detail the events of the accident. This report is typically released within a few days of the event.
No attempt is made to delineate the probable cause. The final report not only recounts the
factual events of the accident or incident, but attempts to determine, whenever possible, the
probable cause of the event. For this research, only accidents which were classified “final” at the
time of writing were included. Crashes where the NTSB was unable to find probable cause, or
where the primary probable cause was mechanical in nature, were also excluded. While HFACS
is well suited for use in maintenance operations, such activity is beyond the scope of this
research. In the end, 44 accidents, spanning 17 years, and encompassing 107 separate causal
factors were included for evaluation.
Utilizing the NTSB Aviation Accident Final Report as source material, each accident’s
causal factors (probable cause) were classified by the author using the HFACS framework. Only
those factors identified by the NTSB in the final report were classified. No additional factors
were added. To avoid the over-representation of any one HFACS category, each error or
violation category was only used once per accident. For example, even though the NTSB
statement of probable cause may have included three separate skill-based errors, only one skillbased error was recorded.
Results
Out of the 44 accidents examined, 20 (45%) resulted in fatalities; 36 (80%) involved
some type of skill-based error; 18 (41%) decisional error; 23 (52%) perceptual error; seven
(16%) exceptional violation; and 23 (52%) supervisory errors.
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Skill-Based Errors
Of the 36 accidents involving skill-based errors, 20 (56%) resulted in fatalities. Every
fatal accident in this study involved some type of skill-based error. Tables 3 and 4 detail the
identified causes and phase of flight associated with skill-based errors.

Table 3
Causes of Skill-Based Errors
Skill-Based Errors by Cause (n = 36)
Failure to Maintain Control
Failure to Maintain Clearance
Equipment Operation
Failure to Follow Checklist
Inadequate Visual Lookout
Excessive Descent Rate

18 (50%)
12 (33%)
1 (3%)
2 (6%)
1 (3%)
2 (6%)

Table 4
Phase of Flight Skill-Based Errors
Cause by Phase of Flight
Failure to Maintain Control
Failure to Maintain Clearance
Equipment Operation
Failure to Follow Checklist
Inadequate Visual Lookout
Excessive Descent Rate

Takeoff
7
2
0
1
1
0

Cruise
5
6
1
1
0
0

Landing
6
4
0
0
0
2

Decision-Based Errors
Eighteen accidents or incidents involved decision-based errors. Causes identified by the
NTSB are listed in Table 5:
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Table 5
Decision-Based Errors
Decision-Based Errors by Cause (n = 18)
Aeronautical Decision Making (failure to
go around, decision to maneuver in an
environment conducive to loss of tail rotor
effectiveness, fuel exhaustion, disregard
for engine oil warning light, etc.)
VFR to IMC
Inadequate Preflight Planning
Selection of Unsuitable Landing Site

10 (56%)

6 (34%)
1 (6%)
1 (6%)

Of special note: the decision to continue flight into IMC (VFR to IMC) resulted in
fatalities in 83% of the accidents examined in this study.
Perception Errors
Faulty perception was cited as a probable cause in 23 (52%) of the accidents and
incidents included in this study. Causal factors for these crashes are outlined in Table 6.
Table 6
Perceptual Errors
Perceptual Errors by Cause (n = 23)
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
Night
See and Avoid
Spatial Disorientation
Brownout

7 (30%)
7 (30%)
6 (26%)
2 (9%)
1 (4%)

Supervisory Preconditions and Errors
Supervisory preconditions and errors were listed as a probable cause in 23 of the 44
accidents examined during this study. Issues identified by the NTSB are included in Table 7.
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Table 7
Supervisory Errors
Supervisory Preconditions and Errors by
Cause (n = 23)
Inadequate Operational Supervision (Lack
of Emergency Operations Center or
inadequate information from dispatch)
Inadequate Training
Failure to Address a Known Problem
Inadequate Supervision of Maintenance
Services
Inadequate Policies and Procedures
Not Providing Proper Equipment (Terrain
Collision Avoidance Systems)

13 (57%)

3 (13%)
2 (9%)
2 (9%)
2 (9%)
1 (4%)

Discussion
HEMS’ flying is dangerous. Its unique flight profile separates it from other Part 135
operations. However, these conditions alone do not adequately explain the seemingly intractable
number of HEMS accidents. This research evaluated 44 HEMS accidents using the HFACS
framework to try and better understand these accidents.
Skill-Based Errors
Failure to maintain control of the aircraft was the most common skill-based error found in
the present study, followed by failure to maintain clearance—a euphemism for inadvertently
hitting an object during flight. Occurrences of skill-based error happened most often during
takeoff and landing, when becoming distracted, or forgetting a checklist item are the most
dangerous.
Flights involving failure to maintain control were, invariably, the result of an untoward
event which caused the pilot to lose control of the aircraft. Loss of tail rotor effectiveness was
cited in three reports (NTSB, 2005, 2007b, 2014) and inadequate preflight planning was listed as
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a causal factor in four of the skill-based accidents (NTSB, 2000a, 2004a, 2008a, 2008b). In one
case (NTSB, 2012b), the pilot lost control of the aircraft while attempting to engage the autopilot
while transitioning from VFR to an IFR flight profile. In another, the NTSB lists the probable
cause as “The pilot's failure to maintain control of the helicopter as a result of his continued
flight into known adverse weather conditions. Factors were the dark night light condition, fog,
low ceiling, and the pilot's lack of total instrument flight time” (NTSB, 2000b).
It is important to note that a frequent concomitant causal factor was perceptual errors.
These errors most commonly involved some degree of spatial disorientation, or the failure to
perceive and arrest an unsafe descent rate. One accident outside of El Paso, Texas in 2010
involved a pilot on his second flight with that company, and it was the pilot’s first flight
uninstructed using Night Vision Goggles (NVG). The accident occurred on a dark, moonless
night with very little cultural lighting. The NTSB attributed the accident to the pilot’s failure to
recognize the aircraft’s sink rate or bank angle prior to impact. All three occupants perished. In
addition to these findings, the NTSB faulted the company for inadequate training and supervision
(NTSB, 2011).
Decision-Based Errors
One perplexing finding is the large number of decisional errors found in the present
research. In order to fly HEMS, the minimum requirement is a Commercial Pilot Certificate and
approximately 1,500-2,000 flight hours on average (Commission on Accreditation of Medical
Transport Systems [CAMTS], 2015). The HEMS flight environment is also highly regulated and
ritualized, with numerous regulatory safeguards put in place over the preceding 20 years in an
attempt to improve the accident rate (Public Hearing Helicopter Emergency Medical Services,
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2009). Despite these efforts, decision-based errors were present in 41% of HEMS accidents in
this study.
The most common decision-based errors were associated with faulty Aeronautical
Decision Making (ADM), followed by continued flight into Instrument Meteorological
Conditions (IMC). Issues identified as faulty ADM by the NTSB included the failure to initiate
a go around, the decision to maneuver in an environment conducive to loss of tail rotor
effectiveness, fuel exhaustion, and disregarding engine warning lights. Previous research
identified the major causes of HEMS accidents as “flying at night, inadvertent flight into IMC,
and CFIT” (Public Hearing Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, 2009, p. 23).
Decision-based errors continue to be a perennial and intractable problem; that begs an easy
answer. What is certain is that these errors are deadly. In this study, out of the 18 accidents with a
decision-error component, 12 (66%) resulted in fatalities, including five out of the six accidents that
involved inadvertent flight into IMC.

Perception-Based Errors
Errors of perception were present in 52% of the accidents in this study. These errors are
not the result of altered perception per se, but the faulty decision-making process that is the result
of unreliable sensations. IMC and night were the two most common cited causes of perceptual
errors in this study. This is consistent with the previous NTSB research cited above (Public
Hearing Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, 2009). Failure to see and avoid collision were
identified as a causal factor in one-quarter (six out of 23) of the accidents reviewed in this study.
Included in this category is one instance of mid-air collision. This accident was counted
as two separate accidents, since this is how it was recorded in the NTSB database. In each case,
the findings were identical: both helicopter pilots’ failure to see and avoid the other helicopter on
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approach to the helipad. Contributing factors were both pilots’ failure to follow normal arrival
and communication procedures (NTSB, 2008c, 2008d).
Supervisory Preconditions and Errors
Organizational and supervisory influences are often overlooked when examining
accidents. A common reaction is to simply stop looking for causes after an initial, plausible
explanation is found. This lack of rigor is not helpful and allows dangerous preconditions to
persist. In this study, supervisory preconditions or errors were identified in 52% (23/44) of the
accidents. The most common precondition cited as a probable cause was lack of operational
supervision; specifically, the lack of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and/or inadequate
information from dispatchers.
This point is illustrated by the example at the introduction to this study (NTSB, 2013).
Even though the pilot was in constant and continued communication with dispatch, no
supervisory input was given regarding the advisability of taking off with a patient on board and
inadequate fuel reserves. Had an EOC been in place to advise or prevent the pilot from flying
until the aircraft was fueled, this accident may not have occurred.
Similarly, in 2004 a pilot flew into a stand of trees during night operations with fog,
killing everyone on board. Unbeknownst to the air medical flight crew, “three other EMS
helicopter operators had turned down the mission, including one who had attempted it but had to
return because of fog conditions.” The NTSB documented that “the accident pilot was not
informed that other pilots had declined the mission because of fog.” In its final report, the NTSB
faulted the operator for “inadequate weather and dispatch information relayed to the pilot”
(NTSB, 2004a).
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In this study, inadequate training and failure to address known problems were
documented by the NTSB as contributing factors in five accidents (NTSB, 2002, 2006a, 2010,
2011, 2012a). This number is likely very low. As detailed previously, there were three skillbased error accidents attributed to loss of tail rotor effectiveness (NTSB, 2005, 2007b, 2014).
Was there a training component to these accidents? The NTSB did not list training as a probable
cause, so they were not recorded as such in this study. That said, by definition, skill-based errors
are those that are due in part to lack of “stick and rudder” flying skills. These problems are
addressed with additional training. Likewise, accidents which had factors such as the selection
of an unsuitable landing site (NTSB, 2001), failure to maintain rotor RPM during aborted takeoff
(NTSB, 2004b), or the failure to execute a go around (NTSB, 2007a) are all problems that beg
the question of training.
Conclusion
HEMS is among the most dangerous types of flying in commercial aviation today (FAA,
2010). Its distinctive flight profile makes it unique among FAR Part 135 operations. This
research used the HFACS framework to analyze HEMS accidents from 2000-2016. In this
study, skill-based errors accounted for the majority of HEMS accidents. This is consistent with
previous research conducted by the NTSB. Of particular note was the frequency of supervisory
preconditions and errors documented. This area is often overlooked or minimized during
accident investigations. The data gathered during this study clearly shows the impact of
organizational decisions on safety.
The HFACS framework is an accepted methodology classifying causal factors. This
research adds to the body of knowledge regarding HEMS accidents and provides a starting point
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for further research, specifically trending the data in an attempt to determine if the numerous
safety measures adopted by the industry are having the desired effect.
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